Recently it was revealed that all sexual assaults involving rape in Oslo in the last five years were committed by “males of non-Western background.” The figures released by the police showed that in the five years between 2005 and 2010, there were 86 rapes, in which 83 of the perpetrators were described as having a “non-Western” appearance. The remaining three cases involved unknown attackers, but, given the identity of the other 83 attackers, it would be reasonable to assume that they, too, were non-Whites.

The women attacked were, of course, overwhelmingly Norwegian.

At the beginning of 2010, 151 000 persons or 3.1 per cent of the Norwegian population had a refugee background, with Iraqis (19,768) and Somalis (17,665) forming the largest groups. Of course, no one is surprised anymore that a remote, historically White country like Norway should now have a burgeoning non-White population. The CIA Factbook figure based on a 2007 estimate put the total non-White population at only 2 percent, so the latest figure marks an alarming rise.

On the Norwegian TV news report that mentioned the rapes, one of the victims, a young blonde girl mentioned that her attacker was a man of Pakistani origin who claimed he had the right to do exactly as he wanted to a woman, “because that is how it was in his religion.”

So, how does such an unnatural situation arise, where a supposedly democratic country allows its young women to be raped by an imported population that has no connection and no cultural affinity with the host country?

To understand this aberration we have look deep into the problem of our so-called “democracy” and how we are represented by our leaders. Whether we have ever passed through an actual period of true democracy (something that could be defined as a period when the government actually did more or less what the people wanted), it is clear that we are now living in a post-democratic world, where governments find ways to impose policies, such as refugee policies, mass immigration, rising taxation, the end of the capital punishment, gay marriage, massive overseas aid, and wars that the vast majority of people, even in their mass media-brainwashed state, simply disagree with.

In most modern Western states, democracy has been subverted by the false dichotomies of mainstream party politics and a compliant mass media that imposes cultural taboos on political discourses that challenge the status quo.

The distant past was also characterized by a lack of direct democracy. In its place, they had a range of rights and relationships between the different classes and the ruling elite; these were later formulated by the political theorists of the 17th and 18th century into the concept of the Social Contract. This was the idea that sovereignty and the power of government was based on some quid pro quo between rulers and ruled: loyalty in return for security and the maintenance of certain rights, for example.

In pre-democratic states, the social contract between ruler and ruled represented a kind of indirect or “shadow democracy,” with an unelected government supposedly doing what the people perceived was in its best interests. As long as kings and oligarchies fulfilled their end of the bargain, there was no need for something as troublesome and messy as real democracy, which might involve revolution, rebellion, and the occasional beheading.

Having stifled direct democracy in a number of ways, the modern post-democratic state also has recourse to certain social contracts in order to achieve the compliance of the ruled. This state effectively mirrors the old pre-democratic state, in that the political elites of both seek to maintain their power through a range of “social contracts” or “understandings” with the public, rather than allowing the masses to get too mixed up in the day-to-day running of things. It is this indirect way of referencing the popular will that has created the terrible situation in Norway. This is a particularly clear-cut example of the dysfunctional way the social contract operates in a modern post-democratic Western society.

Whatever the motivations behind it, the idea of allowing Third World refugees into a modern Western country is predicated on certain ideas that the rulers get the ruled to agree to in some way. These form the basis of the contract.

In this particular case the ideas can be summarized as follows:

  1. Refugees are poor weak helpless victims who are incapable of rape or violence against their benefactors.
  2. The refugees may have a little culture shock, but, as people are essentially the same and interchangeable, they will soon acclimatize and assimilate to Western society.
  3. They will only stay temporarily until the situation in their own country improves.
  4. They will be eternally grateful to the country and people who have helped them.
  5. Westerners are a superior race of benevolent beings and this is a perfect way to demonstrate our racial superiority.

Of course, the last notion is naturally kept in soft focus, all the better to diffuse its warm cosy glow! But, in essence, these are the ideas, pushed by politicians, clergy, and the media in countless speeches, sermons, newspapers, and reports, that constitutes the basis of the social contract. It is considered signed when average members of the public feel apathetic or embarrassed enough not to directly oppose it—in other words, legitimacy is signalled by passive acceptance.

And this is the ink in which such Faustian bargains are writ.

Once the desired policy becomes a fait accompli, the rules naturally change with the social contract immediately being ripped up and replaced with a new one more in keeping with the fast-changing situation. In a pre-democratic society like 17th century England, such a cavalier approach with one’s word of honour could cost the ruler his head, but in the post-democratic society, the confused public acts instead like someone too feckless to have read the small print on their smart phone contract and therefore happy to go along with sudden new excess charges.

In the case of Norway, once the refugees are embedded in society, those favouring mass immigration and the destruction of the local ethnic character no longer have to work so hard, because the anti-refugee position now involves the blatantly cruel and internationally awkward measures that would be required to resolve the problem, namely the forced deportation of 3.1 percent of the country’s population to the brutal, tyrannical, impoverished, and chaotic societies from which it came.

The social contract that created the situation is now a dead letter and is automatically superseded by a new social contract aimed, predicated roughly as follows:

  1. Refugees are poor weak helpless victims, but some of them will rape because they have been traumatised by their past and by racism they have encountered in their new home. We therefore need to redouble our efforts to help them.
  2. Although people are essentially the same and interchangeable, their past traumas and the racism they face has reinforced their culture shock. They may therefore take longer to acclimatize and assimilate to our society.
  3. They may be here permanently as it is extremely difficult to return them to their own country.
  4. We are not helping them just for gratitude.
  5. Westerners are a superior race of benevolent beings. The fact that we can help these people despite all the problems involved, including the rape of our daughters is a perfect way to demonstrate our racial superiority

Pre-democratic societies had a firm grasp of the implicit agreements between rulers and ruled. In the medieval era, kings who intruded on the rights of nobility, clergy, towns, or peasantry faced an inevitable backlash, and vice versa. In post-democratic societies, however, the mistaken notion that we actually control the political process has clearly interfered with our perception of our rights. This has allowed the modern social contract to become malleable and perpetually overwritten. This is how we should view many of the “agreements” and “understandings” that the ruling elites of the West have reached with their people over the last 50 years.

Since capital punishment was abolished in the UK in the 1960s, it has nevertheless remained popular with ordinary people. So, how was the political elite able to bring about this change that clearly ran counter to the wishes of the public? The answer, of course, was a social contract, rather like the one that persuaded Norwegians to allow rapists into their country, based on the following ideas:

  1. Judicial errors are frequent, so capital punishment involves the risk of hanging an innocent person.
  2. Those convicted of capital offences will be locked away for the rest of their lives. “Life will mean life.”
  3. This is a highly sensitive matter touching upon life and death issues, so we should defer to the consciences of those delegated to make these difficult decisions, rather than popular opinion and the views of the masses.

On this basis, the public entered into a tacit understanding or social contract with the ruling class that capital punishment would be removed from the realm of popular politics as long as murderers continued to be severely punished by life imprisonment. This is where the issue still remains today, even though the initial social contract was soon torn to shreds by the ruling class. “Life in prison” is now a joke when murderers can get out in 10 or 15 years, and when the belief in punishment has been scrapped in favour of “rehabilitation.”

A similar pattern can be seen in American political history, regarding the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. Clearly, if White voters had been told of the demographic changes that would result from this “reform”—i.e., the probability of becoming a minority within a few decades—there would have been zero acceptance among the wider public, or even among much of the political class.

Instead, the political elite created a social contract with the people based on the perception that the new act would improve race relations, while in no way threatening White dominance. A notorious incident in this Faustian bargain was the speech Edward Kennedy gave in the senate.

“First, our cities will not be flooded with a million immigrants annually. Under the proposed bill, the present level of immigration remains substantially the same,” he promised.

Secondly, the ethnic mix of this country will not be upset. . . . Contrary to the charges in some quarters, [the bill] will not inundate America with immigrants from any one country or area, or the most populated and deprived nations of Africa and Asia.

The degree to which Kennedy’s words now ring hollow shows the degree to which this social contract was breached by the ruling elite to detriment of the average White Americans, who were suckered into going along with it and who, in later years, have largely acted as if broken word of the political elite was just an accident unworthy of any anger or sense of outrage.

Exactly the same pattern reappears regarding Britain’s membership of the EU. The social contract here was predicated on the notion that the UK could get into bed with its charming continental neighbours and be terribly modern, whilst not having to give up any of our quaint British ways, despite the inherent contradictions such whimsy involved.

In a well-funded campaign in which all the newspapers except the Communist Morning Star supported it, the Yes Camp seized on the unlikely combination of right-winger Enoch Powell and left-winger Tony Benn to suggest that the No Camp were extremist radicals, even though on this issue they were actually being conservative and resisting a revolutionary diminution of national sovereignty.

Once again, a true treatment of the issue and its consequences would have alienated the voters, so here, too, a social contract was founded on lies and deceit, and once agreed on, was quickly abrogated and replaced with amended versions.

In conclusion, both pre-democratic and post-democratic societies lack effective democratic representation. In its place agreements between rulers and people are made that can be conceptualized as social contracts. The major difference is that people in pre-democratic societies historically had a much firmer grasp of their rights and interests than those in post-democratic societies. For example, there is no way that what is happening to young Norwegian women would be tolerated for five minutes in pre-democratic Norway. Perhaps the main reason for this is that the various groups that existed in pre-democratic societies had much stronger identities, something which helped them to identify, define, and defend their interests.